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DATA SECURITY
Abstract: The rising abuse of computers and increasing threat to personal
privacy through data banks have stimulated rruch interest in the technical
safeguards for data. There are four kinds of safeguards, each related to
but distinct from the others. Access controls regulate which users may
enter the system and subsequently which data sets an active user nay read
or write. Flow controls regulate the dissemination of values among the
data sets accessible to a user. Inference controls protect statistical
data bases by preventing questioners from deducing confidential information
by posing carefully desired sequences of statistical queries and correlating
the responses. Statistical data banks are much less secure than most people
believe. Data encryption attempts to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information in transit or in storage. This paper describes
the general nature of controls of each type, the kinds of problems they can
arid cannot solve, and their inherent limitations and weaknesses. The paper
is intended for a general audience with little background in the area.
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rWTimJCTTON
Tin- white-collar criminal, the old adage goes, is a man who has learned
f.n .r-l:cnl with a pencil. In the last decade or too, a few of the more perceptive of these entrepreneurs have discovered that the rewards are greater, and
the: rir.kn lower, if they steal with a computer. There have already been some
spectacular thefts but, so far, computer criminals have been handicapped by a
lack of technical know-how and by a certain inability to think big. Ihe sums
Involved in typical cases of computer abuse would have been front-page news
had they been stolen by armed desperados, but have generally been smaller than
thn haul might have been made by someone with mare expertise and boldness.
Toe records of hundreds of cases of computer abuse have been analyzed by
Parker [PAPK76]. Parker believes many more cases probably remain undetected
or- unreported. Banks in particular are not eager to acknowledge that they have
been embezzled. The median loss in reported cases was airiest $500,000, the
maximum loss in a single case was $2 billion, and the total known loss from
nil computer crime has been about $100 million annually. These figures are
f|r>si. inr?n to rise unless effective count erne as.ures are taken against the more
rxpr>H. fit tacks of the second generation of computer criminals, who are now
Ii',').TTiinf; their trade.
Aiii.'il. 1)0 nercont of reported abuses were data-entry problems. Most of
i.he i'fr.1, w o t h e f t s or embezzlements by a trusted emoloyee who misused his
,-icc'v.:; to the comouter. A few were malicious pranks or sabotage. Nearly
I ! t.hr known cases involve breaches of external security. So far, very
fW computer crimes have involved breaches of internal security: design
rihw:: wi thin the computer system itself. But the rapid proliferation of
<•! iitiiiiil.er;; ant) the increar: inp; sonhisti-

1

cation of users make businesses and individuals Increasingly vulnerable U>
abuse by coirputer experts.

As the potential rewards increase, so will the;

sophistication of attacks on computer systems.
An expert criminal, for exanple, might intercept electronic-fUnds-tram f^rmessages between two banks; within a few hours be could steal, without a trace,
several millions of dollars.

An investigative reporter might deduce, from ques-

tions answered by a medical information system, that a senatorial candidate
once took drugs for depression; if published, this information might force the
candidate to withdraw from the election even though he had been cured.

An em-

ployee of a government agency might blackmail citizens using information purloined from a confidential data bank accessible over a federal conputer network.
These three speculations represent breaches of internal security. Internal safeguards for data security have been actively studied since the early
1960's and in anticipation of future security threats, this work has been intensified in the last few years. Systems designers and engineers are developing
hardware and software safeguards, and theoreticians are studying the inherent
complexity of security probleriB. Although we have made considerable progress,
there is still a wide gap between the safeguards that can be Implemented in the
laboratory — safeguards well within the reach of current technology — and
those available in most commercial systems. Some of the safeguards that users
want are theoretically impossible, or would be prohibitively expensive.
This last point is probably the most important. Absolute security is no
more possible in conputer systems than it is in bank vaults. The goal if; cnr.teffective internal safeguards, sufficiently strong that conputer hardware and
software are not the weakest links in the security chain.
In this paper we shall summarize current research in internal security
mechanisms, how they work, and their inherent limitations. Internal security
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1. ACCESS CONTROLS
Access controls regulate the reading,- changing, 'and deletion of data and
programs. These controls prevent the accidental or malicious disclosure, modJfication, or destruction of records, of data sets, and of program segnents.
They prevent malfunctioning programs from overwriting segments of memory belonging to other programs. They prevent the copying of proprietary software
or confidential data.
Many access control systems incorporate a concept of ownership — that is,
a user may dispense and revoke privileges for objects he owns. This is coirrnon
in file systems intended for the long-term storage of one's own data set?; .'ind
program modules. Not all systems Include this concept; for example, the patient
does not own his record in a medical information system. Access control sy^tuiitj
for owned objects must efficiently enforce privileges that are added, chari^d,
or revoked.
The effectiveness of access caitrols rests on three assumptions. The
first is proper user identification; no one should be able to fool the system
into giving him the capabilities of another. Authentication schemes based on
passwords are conmon and simple, but they need safeguards to thwart systematic
penetration [GAIN78, M0RR78, PAHK76, SALT75, SALT78]. Schemes based on identifying personal characteristics such as voiceprints or dynamic signatures are
more reliable, but more expensive. The second assumption is that unanticipated
observers do not gain access by stealing tapes or disk packs or by wiretapping.
The usual safeguard is encryption, which will be discussed later — information
that could be monitored by strangers is scrambled. The third assumption ic that
privilege-information is heavily protected; this is all the information that
specifies the access each program has to objects in the system. No user':; program can write into the segment containing its own privilege specifiers. Pri-
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vi ] rj 7"-jn format ion is accessible only to authorized programs of the supervisor,
and the privilege to call these programs Is Itself controlled.
The following subsections consider two important classes of access
control mechanisms, for transaction-processing systems and for general-purpose
programming systems. We intend our treatment as a guide to the literature, not
a detailed study of the many tradeoffs that must be faced in practice.

Controls for Transaction-Processing.Systems
The commands issued by the user of a transaction-processing system are
crI lr. on a small library of "transaction programs" that perform specific operation:-,, such as querying and updating, on a data base [DENN71] • The user is not
nllownd to write, compile, and run arbitrary programs. In such systems the
only programs allowed to run are the certified transaction-programs. Therefore it Is possible to enforce the rules of access at the interface between
man and machine.
A data base management system is an example. A user can identify a
sot of records by a "characteristic formula" C, which is a logical expression
u:;inp; the relational operators (=,

<, etc.) and the Boolean operators (AND,

mi, mot); these operators join terms which are indicators of values or conpor. it'loriK of relations. An exanple is
C = "FEMALE AMD PROFESSOR OR (SALARY > $20K)".
Tl i« - l.r;in:-action program looks up a forrrula R specifying restrictions that apply
to u>o Riven user; it then proceeds as if the user had actually presented a
roMimLa C AMD R. The concept of adding to the requests of a user constraints
that depend on that user, is cormion in data management systems [BONC77, ST0N7*}] •
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This form of access control is potentially very powerful. The restriction:;
R may include data dependent restrictions, which are also a function of the
current values of the data [00NW72], or history dependent restrictions, which
are a function of the records previously accessed [HART76]. Implementing thcsi;
kinds of restrictions can be very difficult. We refer the reader to HSIA78 for
details.
When the system allows owners of records to revoke privileges that may tiavc
been passed around among users, it must be designed to also revoke any privi'Lej^es
that emanated from the revoked privilege. Griffiths, Wade, and Fagin have studied
a revocation method that stamps each privilege-specifier with the time of its
creation [GRIF76, FAGI78].

Controls for General-Purpose Systems
General purpose systems permit users to write, compile, and run arbitrary
programs.

It is not possible to certify a priori that arbitrary programs will

forever meet the (changing) access rules of the system, or that there will never
be program failures or equipment malfunctions. Therefore, these systems provide
access control mechanisms as part of the runtime environment, often with hardware
support for performing access checks in parallel with the main computation.

These

mechanisms are typically based on object dependent controls (as opposed to data
dependent controls), which regulate access to an object Irrespective of the values
stored in that object.
Object dependent controls are also needed In transaction processing systems
to protect against faulty transaction programs, equipment malfunctions, and intruders — problems that cannot be prevented simply by "certifying" the trani.;ad;1 or 1
programs.

9

Kx.-imn k' "T an Object Dependent Desipyi
This section illustrates the architecture of object dependent access contolr.. The central concept, capability addressing, has been the subject of
considerable research. Detailed treatments of this design and its tradeoffs
can be found in DENN76b, UND?6, 0RGA72, OFGA73, and SALT75•

Most systems have a large number of segnents (data sets and programs) which
are kept in the slow-speed bulk store, under the auspices of a file system. When
an active program requires access to a segment, the operating system provides
that program with a "capability" for the segment. All a program's capabilities
are r.tored in a "capability list", which is used by the addressing hardware when
Interpreting the program's virtual addresses. We will first describe the operation of the addressing hardware. Then we will describe how a program acquires
capabilities.
Figures 2,3, and 4 sunmarize the mechanism for verifying attempted accesses
to segments stored in the main memory. Figure 2 shows a copy of a 20-word segment stored in memory at the beginning (base) address 10. A descriptor of the
r<>rni (D,L) records the base address B and length L of the segnent. Programs
r'efv»r to words in sepjnents by displacements (line numbers). The corrmand "Read
D" refers to the Dth line of the segment — that is, memory address BfD. A
reference is valid only if the displacement is in range — that is, if
f)

D < L.

Fifrure 3 shows that descriptors of all memory segments may be kept in a
descriptor table. Each descriptor is identified by a unique key K. Now a
pr'opram refers to a segnent by specifying the displacement and the key — thus,
"R(vid K,D" refers to the Dth word in the segment whose key is K. Each descriptor

\
10
i

Is stored with a "presence bit" that tells whether the associated segment i:-.
in the main store; if it is not, as for key 7 in Figure 3, an attempted rofv-ivnw
will trigger a "missing segment fault" that will cause the operating system tu
suspend the program and load the segment. This scheme confers considerable flexibility because the operating system can freely move segments between main arxl
secondary memory merely by updating the descriptors. Because the keys do not
change, no program is affected by relocations of segments in the memory hierarchy.
Figure 4 shows the final step in the scheme: the capability listr; are associated with programs. The access code of a capability specifies one or more kind:;
of access: read (R), write (W), execute (E), or call (C). Read access per-mlt:; a
program to copy a value out of a memory segment; write access permits n pi-orrvmi
to store a value in a memory segment; execute access permits a processor to fetch
instructions from a segment; and call access permits a program to execute a procedure call instruction with that segment as the target. Execute access Is
valuable for restricting access to privileged operations. A program actually
refers to a sequent by a segment nuntier S and a displacement D. Thus "Read S,
D" refers to the Sth segment In the capability list of the program. The reference
is valid only if the Sth capability specifies R-access and contains key K, with
D being within the range specified In the Kth descriptor.
This strategy has special advantages when segnents are shared. Each program can be given its own capability, with its own access code, for the comnon
segment; the comnon segment can be used by different programs whose authors
require no prior agreement on the local segment numbers. In Figure

programs

M and N share the segment with key 3.
With this mechanism each program module can have its own capability list.
In Figure
of N.

Program N's call access for Program P is stored In the 10th sepment

If Program N executes the canmand "Call 10", control will pass to Pi019•am

P. This resembles a standard subroutine call, but with the important difference
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that the called program has a capability list different from that of the cn'l 1<t.
Program P, whose first capability designates the memory segjnent containing the
descriptor table, would be a certified program of the operating system; i i. wmi M
screen all requests to update descriptors. When Program P executes a "Return"
conroand, Program N resumes execution after the call and its capability list, i::
again in control.
The concept of giving each program Its own set of capabilities supports the
principle of least privilege [DENN76, LTND76, SALT75]• Each capability lint
need contain entries only for the segnents required for the associated program
to carry out its task. Damage Is confined In case the program contains an error.
Untrusted programs can be encapsulated and cannot endanger unrelated prof^iim-,.
Critical data, such as the descriptor table of Figure J4, can be hidden away, tam[>ereproof, in a domain accessible only to the program certified to manipulate it.
The foregoing discusses how capabilities are used to limit access. We tum
now to the question of how programs obtain their capabilities In the first place.
Figure 5 Illustrates hew a file system attaches privilege-specifier's to
permanent files. All users are registered in a master directory-

Each user lists

all his files in a personal directory, of which each entry specifies the file's
name (N), length (L), address In the bulk store (BA), a list of authorized users
(AL), and the file's unique Identifier (K). Each entry in an authorization list
specifies the name and type of access permitted of some individual designated
by the owner. The figure shows that Jones has granted read (R) permission for
his File Y to Smith and himself, write (W) permission to himself alone, and no
access to Cox. If a program owned by Smith attempts access to Jones' File Y,
the operating system will intervene and insert a capability (R,K) at some position S In the capability list of Smith's program; thereafter, Smith's program
can access the file by issuing read coirmands with the segment number S. This

• MASTER:

Figure 5.

U..7

Access controls for permanent flies*

is the essence of the scheme used in MULTICS [ORGA72, SALT75, SCHR72].
It is also possible to create a program's capability list during compi !,-ition. This is natural in an environment where the program modules corresrxmd
to managers of extended-type objects, and the capabilities point to the component:;
of a particular object. This view, proposed by Dennis and Van Horn [DKNV6(5j, is
used in the Hydra system [COHE75], the CAP system [NEED77], and the Pkj;;:;c-.y System 250 [ENGL7tJ].

(See GEHR79 for a review.)

Some systems permit owners to revoke privi]e/n3s. Tf all privilej^n,-ci f iciare stored in a central table, It is a relatively simple matter to purer; them
[GRIF76, PAGI78]. But if they are scattered throughout the system in capability
lists, revocation becomes considerably harder: the descriptor table must contain
chains of descriptors that can be broken by an owner; this renders revoked capabilities useless but does not purge than [NEED77, HEDE71J, SALT75 ] -

Limitations of Access Controls
Most security flaws in existing systems are the consequences of desipp shortcuts taken to increase the efficiency of the operating system. Hardware desi [Tied
to support access control efficiently would go a long way toward removing these
flaws. An example is the high overhead in managing small memory sepjnents. Users
are forced to pack data and subprograms into large segments, which means that
small program-blocks cannot be individually protected. This makes the ideal of
a separate capability list for every program very difficult to achieve. Radical
changes in conputer architecture, designed to bridge the "Semantic gap" between
concepts in the progranmlng language and concepts in the machine language, may
be needed to overcome this difficulty. Meyers' SWARD machine [MEYE70] and
Gehrlnger's "typed memory" [GEHR79] point in the right direction.
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Another serious problem with existing systems is excessive privilege vested
in the operating system. A supervisor mode of operation takes over when the
uF^r':; program calls any operating system program. Hie supervisor mode overrides
all or irr>st of the storage-protection mechanisms. The supposedly correct and
trustworthy supervisor programs can manipulate capabilities and segments without
restriction [WILK68]. This difficulty Is ameliorated somewhat in MULTICS, which
has n linear hierarchy of supervisor states, called rings, that confer successively
greater privilege; the user can operate soms untrusted subprograms in rings of low
privilege [SCHR72], Contrary to the principle of least privilege, systems based
on supervisor states permit programs in higher rings to run with much more privilege than they require for their tasks. There Is no efficient way for two cooperating subprograms to have nonoverlapping sets of privileges.
The supervisor-mode problem Is an instance of exposure to the general problem
of "Trojan Horses" [LIND76]. It arises when a subprogram written by an outsider
ibrought Into the domain of a given user. With all the user's privileges and
possibly more, the subprogram is free to wreak havoc — for example, by erasing
rile:-, or entering erroneous data. A system capable of running each subprogram
with its own set of capabilities offers the best practical defense against Trojan
llnr-ne", because the outsider's program can be confined to a domain having the
Jr.viiit. privilege required for the agreed task.
Access mechanisms as outlined here are feasible today at reasonable
r:tv.-,t. The increasing importance of sharing Information among different users
<>r .'i (•m;iran data base, of encapsulating programs, and of limiting damage in case
nP i-rmr or inalfunction, all contribute to a growing pressure on manufacturers
t.ii build better machines.
There are additional limitations that are much more difficult to overcome:
pi-nvinf; that a corrputer system continually meets its access specifications;
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proving that authorizations are continually consistent with owners' Intention:;;
and proving that information stored in files and segments remains amoiif; authorized
users. The possibility of hardware malfunction, which can alter information stored
in the memory, makes rigorous proofs impossible because it subverts the necessary
assumption that all possible changes in system state are controllable.

Arbitrarily

low risks of damage can be achieved only at correspondingly high investments; in
error-checking equipment.
Proving that a conputer system continually meets its access specifications
is straightforward in principle: the prover must show that all programs and hardware for enforcing the current authorizations, and for permitting changes in
authorizations, work as specified.

In practice, this is easier to say th;in do

because the correctness of many complex programs must be established [GAIN78]
and because automatic "program-proving" is a distant goal. Much effort has been
devoted to developing formal access control models which can be elaborated into
the design of a system. At SRI International, the PSOS (Provably Secure Operating
System) is structured as a linear hierarchy of fourteen nested abstract machines,
each of which can be proved correct if the machines below are correct [NEUM77].
This system is expressed in a special language, called SPECIAL, that incorporates
specifications explicitly into the programs.

Several other research groups have

adopted a less anbitious approach; rather than try to prove that the entire system meets all Its specifications, they centralize all the operations affecting
security Into a system nucleus called the "security kernel". The correct operation of the kernel implies that the entire system is secure.

(See MILL76,

POPE78b, POPE78c, and SCHR77.)
Proving that extant authorizations are continually consistent with nwnor':;
intentions is Fraught with difficulties.

Many systems nennJ t users to i:rm\t
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othorv. subsets of their own privileges. In such systems an owner might well be
Interested In the safety problem, which seeks answers to questions of the form,
"Can the programs of Dser X ever gain read access to File Y?'1 Safety problems
are easily answered in the special case of systems conforming to the "take-grant
model" [SNYD77, LIFT78J. However, Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman have shown that
the primitive operations of practical access control systems are sufficiently
powerful to encode the state of an arbitrary Turing Machine into the extant
access control privileges; the halting problem is thereby reducible to the
safety problem, which means that the safety problem Is undecidable. This result
is nv-iinly of theoretical interest, for it is usually possible to answer specific
safoty questions. However, this result explains why it is impossible to devise
a single approach for all safety questions; each one must be analyzed separately.
Proving that stored information remains among authorized users is also
difficult because a user who may read a file may also make a copy, perhaps in
code, which he can then pass along to someone who is denied access to the original.
However, this is not a geniune defect of access controls, which are intended to
rerulate access to stored objects but not what happens to the information contained
iri ther.e objects. Many leaks based on copying can be eliminated by augmenting an
news:; control mechanism with controls on information flow. This is studied next.
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2. FLOW CONTROLS
A flow occurs from object X to object Y when a sequence of instruction:;
that reads from X writes a value into Y. Copying File X into' File Y is an example of a simple flow. Much more subtle flows are possible, as we will note
shortly.
Active flow-control research began in the early 1970s. Most flow controls
employ some concept of security class; the transfer of information from a render
to a receiver Is allowed only if the receiver's security class Is at least as
privileged as the sender's [EENN76a]. A flow policy specifies the channeln
along which information is allowed to move. Flow controls can prevent a service
program from leaking a customer's confidential data. They can block the transmission of secret military data to an unclassified user.
The most general flow controls monitor the detailed data flows in pi^gruritt.
However, such controls are often complex and hard to use efficiently. Controls
based on security classes are usually efficient, though often exasperatingly
conservative.

Flow Policies
The simplest flow policy specifies just two classes of information: confidential (C) and nonconfidential (N), and allows all flows except those from class
C to class N. This policy can solve the confinement problem that arises when a
service program handles customer data, some of which is confidential [FENT7^,
LAMP73, LIPN75]-

The service program may retain some or all of the customer's

nonconfidential data, but it must be prevented from retaining, or releasing to
its owner, any of the confidential data. An income-tax-computing service, for
example, might be allowed to retain a customer's address and the bill for services
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rendered, but riot the customer's Income or deductions.
Government and military conputer systems have a more complex flew policy
('fir i;]; w . in ed data. Rach security class is represented by two parts (i, x),
where i denotes an authority level and x a category, There are usually three
authority levels:

1) confidential, 2) secret, and 3) top secret. There are 2™

categories, comprising all possible contoinations of m conpartments; typical
compartments are U (unrestricted), R (restricted), S ( sensitive), and C (crypto).
Information is permitted to flow from an object with security class (1, x) to
one with class (j, y) only if i < j and only if the conpartments of x are also
compartments of y. Transmissions from (2, RS) to (3, RS) or to (2, RSC) are
allowed, for example, but those from (2, RS) to (1, RS) or to (3, R) are not.

Mechanisms
.Simple flow controls can be enforced by an extended access control mechanism,
which involves assigning a security class (usually called the clearance) to each
rum n i v; program. The program is allowed to read a particular memory segment only
i f j.t:> security class is as high as that of the segment. It is allowed to write
in a r.fff)nent only if its class is as low as that of the segment. This automatically ensures that no information transmitted by the program can move from a
hh-h'M' to a lower class. A military program with a secret clearance, for example,
can t-oad only from objects which are unclassified, confidential, or secret; It can
write only Into objects which are secret or top secret. It is forbidden to write
into unclassified or confidential objects, or to read from top secret objects.
:'}/::I.ems designed at SDC [WEIS69], MURE [MTLL76], Case-Western-Reserve University
IW/U/T^l, and SRI International [MEUM77] are of this type.
The extended access control mechanism has a tendency to overclassify data.
Information flows upward but never downward. This problem can be mitigated by
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letting the security class of a program rise while running, so that. it. k; f>n!.v
as high as the highest security information that the program has read.

Tn thi:;

case the security class of the program is a "higi-water mark" rather than a
clearance. This reduces but does not eliminate overclassification because the
high-water mark cannot be lowered.
An important limitation of the extended access control mechanism is Its
lack of generality. For example, if the income-tax program mentioned ear 1ioris confidential, it will be forbidden to process confidential customer data;
if it is confidential, it will be forbidden to write nonconfidential information
into any of its files. A usable operating system could not be secured by this
mehcanism — all its outputs would have to be classified at least as high as every
class of information stored within. This limitation results from the implicit
assumption that any input of a program can flow to any output, which forcer, the
designer to assume that the confidentiality of each output is as high or- hitfier
than the confidentiality of every input.
To be free of this limitation, flow controls must be able to examine the
way information flows through the statements and variables of a program —
determining precisely how inputs flow to each output. This is not straightforward. Suppose that x is 0 or 1 when this statement is executed:
if x = 0 then y := 0 else y := 1.
This statement copies x to y implicitly by encoding the value of x into the
control flow.

(Note that this program still transmits some information from x

to y even if the initial value of x is unknown.) Implicit flows of thi:;; type
can be easily detected by associating with the program counter a dynamic security
class corresponding to the Boolean expressions which influence it.
Here is a program fragment specifying a flow that is more difficult to detect
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while x ^ 0 do skip; print ('done'); stop .
Thin program will print 'done' only if x - 0; otherwise it will enter an "inrinlU?" loop, which actually means it will eventually be terminated abnormally.
Tn this case, the output produced by the program reveals the position of the
program counter when the program stops, thereby revealing the information encoded
therein,

A partial solution results if one can prove that the loops of one's

program ail terminate [REIT78]. However, all types of abnormal program termination present problems for flow detectors [DENN76a, DENN77].
Several techniques are available for detecting and verifying internal flows
of programs. The most comrron eirploy traditional methods of program verification.
The allowable input/output dependencies of program modules are stated as formal
assertions, which are then proved by tracing data flows within the program. This
approach was used for the systene at MITRE [MELL76], UCLA [P.OFE78c], and SRI
[NEUM77]. A simpler approach results when security classes can be declared for
the variables in the program; using a technique similar to type-checking, the
coup "tier can verify that each program statement specifies flows that are coni:>Lcnt with the given flow policy [DENN77]. Although highly efficient, this
ircthod ialso highly conservative: it will reject programs that would be
t-ert.i fled under a traditional flow analysis. Cohen's information-theoretic
relieves this difficulty by certifying all flows that will occur during
execution of the program [COHE77, COHE78]. Furtek and Millei have proposed
u theory of information flow using analogs of prime irnplicants of switching
theory [FURT78, MILL781; it too can lead to more precise certification. Reitman
:md Andrews have incorporated the flow semantics of DEMN77 into the formalism of
program verification for more precise certification [REIT78].
The foregoing methods are based on static analysis; they certify a program
prior to execution and require no run-time support. However we do not know how
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to certify programs that use variables whose security classes can chance during
execution, or whose inputs can have different security classes on different invocations. These cases require a combination of static analysis and run-Uiiu->
checking. A preliminary study of such a system was made by Fenton, whose "data
mark machine" tagged every memory cell (and the program counter) with a security
class; the processor would Inhibit any instruction whose execution would violate
the flow policy [JENT71!].

Limitations of Flow Controls
We suggested earlier that all mechanisms based on security classe:; tend to
overelassify information, since only upward flow is allowed. This problem can
be mitigated by permitting "downgrading" — the manual lowering of security
classes by an authorized person. It is also possible to permit downward flows
through certain information-losing programs. Such programs are supposed to
filter cut enough information about their Inputs that their results are of lower
confidentiality. Not much is known about such programs except that, as we shall
observe in the discussion of inference control,, many programs believed to filter
out information actually do not.
One type of flow cannot be controlled easily, if at all. A program can
convey information to an observer by encoding it into some physical phonomenon
without storing It into the memory of the conputer. These are called flows on
covert channels [LAMP73, LIPN75]. A simple covert channel is the running time
of a program. A program might read a confidential value, then enter a loop that
repeatedly subtracts 1 from the value until it reaches zero, whereupon it stops.
The owner of the program can determine the confidential value simply by observing
the running time. More conplex channels exploit other resource-usage patterns
such as the electric power consumed while running a program.
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The only known technical solution to the problem of covert channels requires
that the owner of a job state in advance what resources his job will use and how
much time it will take. The requested resources are dedicated to the Job, and
the results, even if incomplete, are returned to the user at precisely the tlms
specified. This strategy allows the user to deduce nothing from running time or
resource usage that he did know beforehand; but even then, he can deduce something
from whether or not his program was successfully completed. This scheme can be
prohibitively expensive. Cost effective methods of closing all covert channels
completely probably do not exist.
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3. INFERENCE CONTROLS
When Information derived from confidential data mist be declassified for
wider distribution, the rules of flow control most be suspended. This is true
of statistical data bases (data banks) which contain sensitive in format ion iibout
individuals and must provide various kinds of statistical sunmaries about the
population. The Bureau of the Census, for example, is charged by law to co'Hoct
information on all citizens and to report sunmaries of this information without
revealing any particulars. Similarly, medical information systems are supposed
to produce health statistics but not to release health data about any one patient.
The problem is that sunmaries contain vestiges of the original information;
a snooper might be able to reconstruct this information by processing enough
summaries. This is called deduction of confidential information by Inference.
When the information pertains to an individual, the deduction compromises his
privacy. The objective of inference controls to make the cost of obtaining
confidential Information unacceptably highWhen invoking a query program, a questioner supplies a characteristic formula
C, which is a logical formula whose terms are joined by the Boolean operators (AND,
OR, NOT). The set of records whose contents satisfy formula C is called the query
set for C. The query program's response is computed from the query set; it may be
the count of the records, the sum of values in the records, or the selection of a
value, such as a maxinum or median.
A record is compromised if a questioner can deduce its confidential values
by correlating responses to his queries, using any prior information he might
have. Most conpromises are based on isolating a desired record at the Intersection of a set of interlocking queries. Defenses include controls that
withhold response for improper query set sizes and overlaps, controls that
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distort the responses by rounding or by falsifying data, and controls that apply
queries to random samples of the data base. Examples are Riven in the next subsections.

Controls on Query Set Sizes and Overlaps
When the questioner has complete control over the query set, and when responses are undistorted, compromise is easy. This Is Illustrated by a dialogue
between a questioner and a medical data base:
Q: How many patients have these characteristics?
Male
Ag2 JJ5-50
Married
2 children
Harvard Law Degree
Bank Vice President
A: 1.
Suppose the questioner knows that Fenwick has these characteristics; he now
attempts to discover something confidential about Fenwick from this query.
Q: How many patients have these characteristics:
Male
Age 45-50
Married
2 Children
Harvard Law degree
Bank Vice President
Took drugs for depression
Tn1s query will respond with "1" if Fenwick has taken drugp for depression and
"0" otherwise.
The principle of this compromise is simple. The questioner finds a formula
(• whoso query set count is 1. He can then discover whether the individual thus
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isolated has any other characteristic X by asking, "Hew many individuals satisfy
C AND X?"

(Ihe response "1" indicates that X is characteristic of the individual

and "0" indicates not.) This attack was first reported by Hoffman and Miller
[HOFF70].
It might seem that this compromise could by prevented by a minimum query
set control:
Do not respond to queries for which there are fewer than
k, or wore than n-k, records in the query set, where n is
the total number of records in the data base.
The por»1 tive integer k in this control is a design parameter specifying the
smallest allowable size of a query set. If the query-language permits coirplementation, a maximum size n-k of the query set must also be enforced, for otherwise the questioner could pose his queries relative to the complement (NOT C)
of the desired characteristics (C).
Unfortunately, this control Is ineffective. Schlorer showed that conproniiufN": may be possible even for k near n/2 by the technique of a "tracker"
[PCHL75, SCHL79]. The basic Idea is to pad small query sets with enough extra
rreordr. to make them answerable, then subtract out the effect of the extra records. Schlorer called the formula Identifying the extra records the tracker
because the questioner can use it to "track down" additional characteristics of
an individual.
Suppose that a questioner, who knows from external sources that an individual T is characterized by the logical formula C, is able to express C in the
form 0 = (A AND B) such that queries for the formulae A and (A AND NOT B) are
both answerable.

Schlorer called the formula T = (A AND NOT. B) the tracker of I.

Table l shows a data base recording n = 8 secret political contributions. Suppose
that k = ?; then responses are given only to queries applying to at least 2 but
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Sex

Name
Abel
Baker
Charles
Darwin
Engel
Fenwlck
Gary
Hart

TABLE I>

M
M
M
F
F
M
F
M

Occupation
Journalist
Journalist
Entrepreneur
Journalist
Scientist
Scientist
Doctor
Lawyer

Contribution ($)
3000
500

1
5000
1000
20000
2000
10000

Political contribution database.
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not more than 6 individuals. Suppose further that the questioner believes thai:
C = (JOURNALIST AND FEMALE) uniquely Identifies Darwin. The minimum query
control would prevent direct questioning about Darwin. The dialogue below show;-,
how Darwin1s contribution can be deduced by using as tracker the formula
T = (JOURNALIST AND NOT FEMALE) = (JOUFNALIST AND MALE).
Q: How many persons are JOURNALIST?
A: 3
Q: How many persons are JOURNALIST AND MALE?
A: 2
By subtracting the second response from the first, the questioner verifier, that
(JOURNALIST AND FEMALE) identifies only one individual (Darwin). The questioner
continues with
Qr What was the total of contributions by all persons
who are JOURNALIST?
A: $8500.
Q: What was the total of contributions by all persons
who are JOURNALIST AND MAIE?
A: $3500.
Since Darwin is the only female Journalist, her contribution is the difference
between the response of the second query and the response of the first ($5000).
It might seem that the effort to compromise the entire data base is very
high because the questioner would have to know Identifying characteristics of
each individual In order to construct a tracker for that individual. However,
if a questioner can find any formula whose query set contains at least 2k but
not more than n-2k records, he can use that formula as a "general tracker" to
determine the answer to any (unanswerable) query of the data base [DBNN79a].
Schlorer has shown that often more than 99? of the possible formulae will be
general trackers, and that the effort to retrieve data using trackers is usually
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quite low [SCHL79]•

It is possible to find a tracker with at most log^S queries,

where S is the number of possible distinct configurations of characteristics
fni-wj/qi-i.
Tracker-based compromises enploy groups of records having high overlaps.
'Ihe compromise illustrated above works precisely because Darwin is the only
JOURNALIST excluded from the group (JOURNALIST AND MALE). To protect against
trackers, one might consider a minimum overlap control:
Do not respond to a query that has more than a predetermined
number of records in coirmon with every prior query.
Such .1 control is obviously infeaslble: before responding, the query program
would have to corrpare the latest query group against every previous one. But
even if feasible, this control can be subverted in data bases where each confidential value appears just once [EOBK79]. This dialogue Illustrates such compromise using queries that overlap by one record:
Q: What was the largest of the contributions by persons
who are JOURNALIST?
A: $5000Q: What was the largest of the contributions by persons
who are FEMALE?
A: $5000.
['•ec.au:> each contribution is unique, there can be only one person who is JOURNALIST, FEMALE, and contributed $5000 (Darwin). Indeed, the same compromise
work:-, even if the query program occasionally returns the contribution of the
WTvmp; person [DEMI77];
Q: What was the smallest of the contributions by persons
who are JOURNALIST?
A:

(lying): $5000.
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Q: What was the largest of the contributions by persons
who are FEMALE?
A:

(truthfully) $5000.

A minimum overlap control may also be subverted by solving a linear system of
equations for an unknown data value [DOBK79, SCHW79]These examples illustrate compromises that use the contoinatorial principle
of inclusion and exclusion to Isolate a record. A design that can prevent this
is a partitioned data base [YU78]:
Store the records in groups, each containing at least
some predetermined number of recrods. Queries may
apply to any set of groups, but never to subsets of
records within any group.
With this control, attacks based on inclusion and exclusion can, at best, isolate
one of the groups — but queries for single groups are allowed. "Micro-aggregation" is a form of partitioning: groups of individuals are aggregated into synthetic "average individuals" and statistics are computed for the synthetic In
individuals rather than the real ones [FEXG70]. The partitioned data base has
two practical limitations that can be quite severe. First, the legitimate fY-ee
flow of statistical summaries can be inhibited by excessively large groups or by
ill-considered groupings-

Second, forming and re-forming groups as records are

Inserted, updated, and deleted frcm the data base leads to excessive bookkeeping.

Rounding and Error Inoculation
The second class of inference controls is based on distorting the responses.
These are usually called rounding controls because the exact answer to a query
is perturbed by a small amount before it is reported to the questioner.
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Rounding by adding a zero-mean random value is Insecure since the correct
answer can be deduced by averaging a sufficient nurttoer of responses to the
same query. Rounding by adding a pseudo-random value that depends on the data
is preferable since a given query always returns the same response. Although
reasonably effective, this method can sometimes be subverted with trackers
[SCHL77], by adding durrmy records to the data base [KAHP70], or simply by comparing the responses to several queries [ACHU78].
A perturbation can also be achieved with error inoculation: the value in
a record is randomly perturbed or replaced by another value before it is used
to compute a statistic [ffiCK79, BORU72, CAMF77]• Data could be nidified before
being stored in a record, In which case the orlglanl data Is discarded. This
can have serious adverse consequencies if the correct data is supposed to be
available for authorized users of the data base. Alternatively a "perturbation
factor" can be stored permanently in the record along with the original data;
it is applied when the data is used in a query.
Like rounding, error inoculation reduces the quality of the statistics
released. To prevent compromise, large errors may have to be introduced into
the data.
A variation of this approach, which may yield more accurate statistics, Is
data swapping: the values of fields of records are exchanged so that all i-order
:;tat1atics (which involve i attributes) are preserved for i <_ d and some d
|t)AU;yft, SCHL78]. Even if a questioner succeeds in isolating a value, he has no
way or knowing with which individual it is actually associated. The problem with
the approach is the difficulty of finding sets of records whose values can be
swapped. It remains to be seen whether this control can be cost effective.
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Random Samples
The third group of controls is based on applying queries not to the entiredata base but to a "random sample" — a subset of records chosen at random.
This group Is potentially the most effective beacuse it deprives the questioner
of control over the contents of query sets. The i960 U.S. Census, for example,
was distributed on tape as a random sanple of one record in one thousand; each
sample record contained no name and It specified location only by size of city
in one of nine geographic regions [HANS71]. The cleverest snooper would have
at best 1/1000 chance of associating a given sample record with the right individual. These odds are too poor for compromise of the sample to be worthwhile.
Coimiercial data management systems now permit the construction of small to medium-scale data bases which change constantly through insertion, deletion,
and modification of records. A small random sanple would be useless hocause it
would not be statistically significant and because it would not represent the
current state of the data base. For these reasons random samples have been
ignored as an inference control in such data bases.
However, when contained with a minimum query set control, random sanple
queries can be an effective defense [DEWN79c]. The scheme works as follows.
As it locates each record satisfying a given formula C, the query program
determines whether or not to keep that record for the "sampled query set".
This determination should idealy be pseudo-random so that the same sampled
query set Is conputed any time the given formula C is presented. Each queried
record Is selected idependently for the sampled query set with a given, fixed
probabllitypp. Statistics then are computed from the sanpled query set. A
minimum query set control Inhibits the response if the true query set's size Is
too small or too large.
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With a simulated data base and p = .9375, this method estimated counts (and
sums) of answerable query sets to within 15? of their true values [DENN"79c]. However, the estimates of counts (and sums) estimated with trackers contained errors
of several hundred percent; this is because the questioner must estimate small
counts (or sums) by subtracting large counts (and sums).

(An Illustration: the

questioner tries to find the count for C by subtracting the response 100 from
the response 101, both of which have error ± 1; the difference, 1, has error ±2.)

Limitations of Inference Controls
Because queries inevitably carry some information out of the data base,
one cannot reasonably hope to design a system that is impossible to conpromise.
The objective of research on Inference controls is to discover how much conputational work, measured by conputer time or by dollars spent, would be required
to compromise a particular system. This would enable designers either to raise
the cost of compromise beyond a specific threshold, or to declare that the der.irrd

level of security could not be implemented with the given cost constraints.

'the query functions of many comnercial data base systems seem to release
much more Information about confidential records than many people have suspected.
Without proper controls, data bases subject to simple compromises will be the
rule rather than the exception. When confcined with minimum query set restrictions,
random sanple queries appear to offer the best defense.
A final defense against snooping is threat monitoring — inspection of logs
or audit trails for unusual patterns of queries, especially many queries for the
same

records [H0FF70].

Although it does not attempt to control the flow of infor-

mation through query programs, monitoring threatens exposure of illegal activity-
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4. CRYPTOGRAPHIC OONTROLS
Access, flow, and inference controls may not prevent accidental or malicious
disclosures of sensitive data. None of these controls helps if an operator1 leave
a listing of the password file on a desk, if confidential data is moved off-line
during backup or maintenance, if transmissions are tapped or played back, or if
hardward and software are faulty. Encryption is a coraiDn safeguard for data
stored in, or in transit through, media whose security cannot be guaranteed by
these other controls. With the help of a secret key (K) the sensitive plaintext (M) is scrambled into unintelligible ciphertext (I?) before being put in
the insecure medium.
In a traditional cryptosystem, illustrated in Figure 6, there la a slowspeed secure channel by which the sender can inform the receiver of the key K
used to encode the message. The message itself, transmitted at high speed
through the insecure medium, Is secure as long as the key Is secret. Simnoris
calls this synmetrlc encryption because the same key is used at both ends of the
channel [SUWI79] • The code is broken if an intruder can deduce the key by analyzing the ciphertexts. Keys are changed regularly, usually more often than the
time in which the cleverest intruder is believed capable of locating the key
systematically.
The code will be unbreakable if the key is a sequence of random bits as
long as the message (pseudo-random generation will not dol); each key bit specifies whether the corresponding message bit is complemented or not. With such a
key, called a one-time pad, each bit of ciphertext Is purely random and uncorrected with all other bits of ciphertext. Practical cryptosysterns are based on
keys that are much shorter than the messages; because the intruder may know the
enciphering and deciphering algorithms, the security of these cryptosystem:
depends on the secrecy of the keys and the conputational difficulty of inverting
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Encryption using one key (traditional view)•
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the enciphering algorithms. Overviews of cryptosystems are given by Di fTi e
and Hellman [DIFF76], Gardner [GARD77], Hoffman [HOFF77], Konheim [KONH78],
Lempel [L04P79], and Simmons [SIMM79]• Fascinating accounts of codes and their
breakings have been written by Kahn [KAHN67] •
It is reasonable to suppose that military and diplomatic experts have secure
channels for exchanging encryption keys — for.example secret couriers. Therefore the security of the traditional cryptosystem is properly measured as the
work required for an intruder to invert the code through cryptanalysis.
With conputer networks, It is no longer reasonable to suppose that Individual senders and receivers have secure means of exchanging secret keys. Needham
and Schroeder [NEED78] and Popek [POFE78a] have outlined methods, called "protocols", for simulating a secure key-exchange channel. Figure 7 gives the central
idea of the protocol suggested by Needham and Schroeder. A sending conputer A
and a receiving computer B seek a secret key K from a secure key-generatlrig
facility (KG). The conputer KG contains a list of special secret keys, one
assigned to each conputer of the network; thus A and KG can exchange secret
messages encrypted with key S. known only to the two. Having decided to send
S
A
a message to B, A first transmits the message (A, (I, B) ) to KG, wherein I
is a message-identifier chosen arbitrarily by A. Since A's name is a plaintext
prefix of this iressage, KG can locate A's secret key, S A , and decipher the comS

ponent (I, B)

A

. Then KG generates a key K and responds to A with the message
Sr So
(I, K, (K, A) ) . Only A can decode this message and obtain the newly genSo

erated key K and the enbedded ciphertext T = (K, A) ; A can also check that
this message is a unique response from KG by verifying that I is one of his own
(recent) message-Identifiers. Then A forwards the ciphertext T to B, who is
the only one capable of decoding It. After these exchanges, both A and B have
the key K and can begin transmitting directly to each other in code.

32(f)

KG

List of
Secret Keys

A

to

KG to
A

to

ure 7.

KG:

( A , ( t , B)

sA

B

Sb

)

A:

( I , K,

( K , A )Sb

B:

(K,

>B

A)

/>

)S*

Protocol for allocating A and B a common key K for exchanging
messages.

33

Ihe security of this system clearly depends on the security of the key-generating facility. Both A and B must trust KG to generate a unique key K, to keep
all keys secret, and to not monitor any of their private transmissions.
This example illustrates why key management is essential to secure cryptographic control in conputer networks. The security of these cryptosystenK i.s
often less dependent on the indecipherability of the code than it is on the
ability to secure the keys. Saltzer has argued that our demonstrated inability
to protect passwords in file systems suggests that many cryptosysterts will be
easily broken not by cryptanalysis but by elementary attacks on the key manager.
(See SALT78 and also DENN78b, EHRS78, GAIN78, MATY78, MORR78, and POPE78a.)

Ihe Data Encryption Standard (PES)
In 1977 the National Bureau of Standards announced a standard encryption
algorithm (DES) to be used In unclassified U.S. Government comnunications [NBS77].
The algorithm was developed by IBM, which offers products that use DES [EHRS78,
I£NN78, MATY78]. Each 64-bit block of plaintext undergoes a conplex transformation comprising 16 levels of substitutions and permutations, all controlled hy a
56-bit key. The algorithm can be implemented cheaply as an 151 chip which would
allow it to operate at a high data rate.
The EES can be used as in Figure 6, providing "end-to-end encryption" on
the channel between the sender A and receiver B. A user can also use DES to
encipher files for storage in removable or insecure media. However, the data
must usually be deciphered for processing; other mechanisms, such as access and
flow controls, are needed to protect the data while it is plaintext. Rive:;t has
studied cryptosystems which allow a limited nurrber of operations which can be
performed directly on the clphertext; however, these systems must exclude conpare
operations if they are to be hi^ily secure [RIVE78b],

The DES can also be used as a one-way cipher to secure files containing
passwords [EVAN7^, MORR78, WILK68]. Each password X is used as the key to encipher a predetermined block of plaintext; the resulting ciphertext C^

is placed

in the password file along with the name of the password's owner. When a user, N,
presents a password X, the password is accepted only if C*

is already In the

password file with name N. Because no password is actually stored as plaintext
in the system, passwords are protected even if the file is disclosed.
The DBS is not universally regarded as a highly secure cryptosystem. Diffie
and Hellman argue that it is possible for about $20 million to build a highly
parallel computer that will locate a key by exhaustive search in about 12 hours
[DIFF77] • At the 1978 National Computer Conference, Hellman showed how to use
about
within

million of conventional equipment with a heuristic search to find a key
hours. Diffie and Hellman maintain that a 128-bit key (not the 56 bits

in the standard) would make the EES virtually unbreakable. IBM maintains that two
DES chips in series can, with double encryption, simulate a single EES chip with
a ll?-bit key [H0FF77]. IBM also maintains that, even with 56-bit keys, DES Is
not likely to be the weak link In the security chain.

1 '1 ihlie-Key Encryption
In 1976 Diffie and Hellman proposed a new kind of cryptosystem, which they
called public-key encryption [DIFF76]. Each user has a matched pair of keys, the
"public key" P and the "secret key" S. Each user publishes his public key to
everyone through a directory but reveals his secret key to no one. As with the
HTCT., the encryption algorithm need not be secret.
Enciphering a message M with the public key P gives a ciphertext M*3 which
can be sent to the owner of the public key. The recipient deciphers the ciphertext lining his secret key S to retrieve the message:

= M. Since P and S
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are a matched pair, no one but the owner of the public key can decipher Fi1. The
operations of P and S are conmitative, that is, (MP)S= (M3)*3 = M. It is in feasible to conpute one key given the other. Figure 8 Illustrates coruiunlcation
between two conputers by this scheme. Slnrnons calls this asyiimetrlc encryption
because different keys are used at the ends of the channel [SITWg ]. Examples
of specific algorithms are in DIFF76, HELL78, KONH78, IEMP79, I®RK78, and HTVP:78a.
Public-key cryptosystems also present an easy solution to "digital signatures",
the problem of proving that a particular message was in fact transmitted by the
person claiming to have transmitted It. To create a signature, one enciphers a
predetermined message M with his secret key S, offering M 2 as the signature.
Anyone challenging the signature need only apply the public key P of the purported
signer, for only then will

= M.

(See DIFF76, RIVE78a, KONH78, and LEMP79 •)

Digital signatures can also be Inplemented with single-key cryptosystenr,, but the
solution is much less elegant [NEED78, RABI77].
A result by Shamir, FtLvest, and Adleman suggests that a modification of
public-key encryption could also be an approximate one-time pad [SHAM79]. Users
A and B each select a matched pair of keys but keep both secret. Then A sends
SA
Sr Sa
the enciphered message M
to B, who then enciphers it and returns (M )
SA.SB
SR
S r Sa Pfl
(M ) to A. Then A applies his second key, P , to obtain M = (CM ) ) ,
which he returns to B. Finally, B obtains the message M by applying his Pg,
Sr p R

since M = (M ) . Ihis is not a true one-time pad because three messages are
actually sent using the four keys.
Its proponents argue that public-key encryption is more secure than DES
because no user need rely on the security of the conputer network to safeguard
his secret key. Indeed, a user's local, personal conputer can interface with the
network through the encryption device as in Figure 8 and his secret key can be
engraved electronically Into a memory chip that can be plugged into the encryption device; he could then guard his encryption key to the same extent as any
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other key in his possession [DENN78b].
It is true that the public keys can be distributed by a public directory
without endangering the secret keys. However, a user still needs assurances that
the key received from the (purported) public directory Is in fact the public key
of the requested individual. Confidence in correct distribution of public keys
can be increased if the public directory signs its responses [KONF78, NEED78].
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5- SUMMARY
The four kinds of internal security controls — access, flow, inference,
and cryptographic — couplement each other. No one of them can solve the problems handled by the other three.
Access controls operate at the external interface, verifying that an individual attempting to use the system is authentic, and internally, verifying that
each running program generates references only to authorized segments of memory.
Tim ideal access control operates each program in a domain having the minimum
privilege required for the immediate task. The principle of minimum privilege
contributes greatly to security by protecting against "Trojan Horses", and to
reliability by minimizing the extent of possible damage by a malfunctiong program.
Flow controls regulate the dissemination or copying of information by
prohibiting derived data from having lower confidentiality than the original. The
higher the data's confidentiality, the stricter the rules on its dissemination.
When applied to program input-to-output flow, these controls offer a partial
:-.o]ut.ion to the "confinement problem".
In Terence controls prevent "leakage" through programs that produce summaries
of groups of confidential records. They reduce the risk that, by correlating the
ror.pnnsos from many sunmaries, a user can deduce the confidential values denied
him by access and flow controls.
Cryptographic controls protect information stored, or transmitted, in insecure media. The data encryption standard (DES) is efficient and economical,
though it has been criticized as being breakable and overly dependent on secure
key management.

Public-key encryption does not rely on any central manager for

-nf'eguarding secret keys, though it requires secure distribution of public keys.
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All these controls are subject to practical (and sometimes theoretical)
limitations which keep them from achieving their objectives under all condi tions.
No mechanism is perfectly secure. A good mechanism reduces the risk of compromise
to an acceptable level.

ACKNOWI£DGEMENTS

A preliminary version of this paper appeared under the title "The limit:;
of data security," in the pilot Issue of ABACUS, the Scientific-American style
magazine for the computing comnunity undertaken by the American Federation of
Information Processing Societies (A5TPS). We are grateful to AFIPS for permission to use parts of the pilot article in this one.
We are grateful to William E. Boggs, whose journalistic genlous consider-ably
improved most of the draft. We are also grateful to Adele Goldberg and the referees for their conments and suggestions.

39

REFERENCES

ACHU78

Achugbue, J.O. and Chin, F.Y., "Output Perturbation for Protection
of Statistical Data Bases," Department of Computing Science, Univ.
of Alberta (Jan. 1978).

ANDE72

Anderson, J.P., "Information Security in a Multi-user Conputer
Environment," in Advances in Computers 12, Morris Rubinoff (ed.),
Academic Press (1972).

BECK79

Beck, L.L., "A Security Mechanism for Statistical Databases," Dept.
of Comp. Sci. and Eng., Southern Methodist Univ., Jan 1979-

BONC77

Bonczek, R.H., Cash, J.I., and Whlnston, A.B., "A Transformational
Gramnar-Based Query Processor for Access Control in a Planning
System," ACM Trans, on Database Systems

MRU/I

2, it (Dec. 1977), 326-338.

Boruch, R.F., "Maintaining Confidentiality in Educational Research:
A Systematic Analysis," Amsr Psychologist 26 (1971), ^13-^30.

COTP77

Campbell, D.T. et al., "Confidentiality-Preserving Modes of Access
to Files and to Interfile Exchange for Useful Statistical Analysis",
Evaluation Quarterly 1, 2 (May 1977), 269-299-

COIK75

Cohen, E. and Jefferson, D., "Protection in the HYDRA Operating
System," Proc. 5th Symp. on Operating Systems Principles, Oper. Sys.
Rev.

muE77

9, 5 (Nov. 1975), 141-160.

Cohen, E., "Information Transmission in Computational Systems,"
Proc. 6th Symp. on Operating Systems Prlnc., Oper. Sys. Rev. 11,
5 (Nov. 1977), 13-56.

COKE78

Cohen, E., "Infomation Transmission in Sequential Programs," in
Fbundation of Secure Conputinp; (see DEMI78), 297-335.

10

Conway, R.W., Majcwell, W.L., and Morgan, H.L., "Ch the Implementation
of Security Measures in Information Systems," Corrm. ACM

15, Jl (April

1972), 211-220.
Dalenius, T. and Reiss, S.P., "Data-Swapping - A Technique for
Disclosure Control," Computer Science, Brown Univ. (1978).
DeMillo, R.A., Dobkin, D. and Lipton, R.J., "Even Data Bases that
Lie Can Be Compromised," tf.fe Trans.on Software Ehgrg. SE-'1, 1 (J;m.
1977) 73-75DeMllo, R.A., Dobkin, D.P., Jones, A.K., and Lipton, R.J. (cd:;.)
Foundations of Secure Computation, Academic Press (1978).
Denning, P.J., "Third Generation Computer Systems," Computing Surveys
3, 4 (Dec. 1971), 175-216.
Denning, D.E., "A Lattice Model of Secure Information Flow," Corrri.
ACM

19, 5 (May 1976), 236-242.

Denning, P.J., "Fault Tolerant Operating Systems," Conputlnp Surveys
8, 4 (Dec. 1976), 359-389Denning, D.E. and Denning, P.J., "Certification of Programs for
Secure Information Flow," Comm. ACM 20, 7 (July 1977), 504-512.
Denning, D.E., Denning, P.J., Garland S.J., Harrison, M.A., and
Ruzzo, W.L., "Proving Protection Systems Safe," Technical Report
CSD TR-

, Conputer Science Dept. Purdue Univ., W. Lafayette, BI

47907 (Feb 1978)
Denning, D.E., "Secure Personal Coirputing in an Insecure Network,"
CSD-TR-270, Conputer Sciences, Purdue Univ., W. Lafayette, IN 47907
(July 1978) to appear In Conn. ACM.
Denning, D.E., Denning, P.J., and Schwartz, M.D., "The Tracker: A
Threat to Statistical Data Base Security," ACM Trans, on Database
Systems 4, l(March 1979), 76-96.

4i

DKNN79b

Denning, D.E., and SchlSrer, J., "A Fast Procedure for Finding a
Tracker in a Statistical Database," Conputer Sciences, Purdue Univ.
and Institut fUr Medizinische Statistlk und Dokunentation, Universltat Giessen, W. Germany, Feb. 1979.

DENN79c

Denning, D.E., "Securing Databases Under Random Sanple Queries,"
Conputer Sciences, Purdue Univ., April 1979-

DWV66

Dennis, J.B, and Yan Horn, E.C., "Programming Semantics for Multiprogranmed Computations," Conm. ACM 11, 5 (May 1966), 143-155.

DIFF76

Diffie, W. and Hellman, M. "New Directions in Cryptography,"
TEEF. Trans, of Info. Theory

DIFF77

IT-22, 6 (Nov. 1976), 644-654.

Diffie, V/. and Hellman, M.E., "Exhaustive Cryptanalysis of the NBS
Data Encryption Standard," Conputer 10, 6 (June 1977), 74-84.

DOBK79

Dobkin, D., Jones, A.K., and Lipton, R.J., "Secure Data Bases: Protection Against User Inference," ACM Trans. on Database Systems 4, 1
(March 1979), 97-106.

EHRS78

Ehrsam, W.F., Matyas, S.M., Meyer, C.H., and Tuchman, W.L., "A Crypto graphic Key Management Scheme for Implementing the Data Encryption
Standard," IBM Systems J. 17, 2 (1978), 106-125.

IM7L7'I

Bigland, D.M., "Capability Concept Mechanism and Structure In System
250," Proc. of Int'l Workshop on Protection in Operating; Systems,
IRIA, Rocquencourt, France (Aug. 1974), 63-82.

KVAN7'I

Evans, A. Jr., Kantrowitz, W., and Weiss, E., "A User Authentication
Scheme Not Requiring Secrecy in the Conputer," Comn. ACM 17, 8 (Aug.
1974), 437-442.

FABR74

Fabry, R.S., "Capability-Based Addressing," Comm. ACM 17, 7, (July
1974), 403-412.

FAOT78

Fagln, R., "On an Authorization Mechanism," ACM Trans, on Database
Syst. 3> 3 (Sept. 1978), 310-319.

42

FEIG70

Feige, E.L. and Watts, H.W., "Protection of Privacy Throuj+i Mic.n>aggregation," in R.L. Bisco (ed.) Data Bases, Conputer, and the -Social
Sciences, Wiley-Interscience (1970).

FENT74

Fenton, J.S., "Memoryless Subsystems," Computer J. 17, 2 (May 1974).
143-147-

FURT78

Furtek, F., "Constraints and Compromise," in Foundations of Secure
Computation (see DEMI78) 189-204.

GAIN78

Gaines, R.S. and Shapiro, N.Z., "Some Security Principles and Their
Application to Corrputer Security," in Foundations of Secure Computation (See EEMI78) 223T236; also in Operating Systems Rev., 12, 3,
(July 1978), 19-28.

GARD77

Gardner, M., "Mathematical Games," Scientific. Arrerican 237, 2 (Aug.
1977), 120-124.

GEHR79

Gehringer, E., "Functionality and Perforrrance In Capability - Based
Operating Systems," Ph.D. Thesis, Computer S ences, Purdue Univ.
(May 1979).

GRAH72

Graham, G.S. and Denning, P. J., "Protection - Principles and Practice," Proc. 1972 AFIPS SJCC 40 (1972), 417-424.'

GRIF76

Griffiths, P.P., and Wade, B.W., "An Authorization Mechanism for a
Relational Database System," ACM TODS 1, 3 (Sept. 1976), 242-255-

HANS71

Hansen, M.H., "Insuring Confidentiality of Individual Records 1n
Data Storage and Retrieval for Statistical Purposes," AFIPS Conf.
Proc.. 1971 FJCC, 39 (1971), 579-585-

HARR76

Harrison, M.A., Ruzzo, W.L., and Ullman, J.D., "On Protection in
Operating Systems," Comm. ACM 19, 8 (Aug. 1976), 461-471-

HART76

Hartson, H.R. and Hsiao, D.K., "Full Protection Specifications in
the Semantic Model for Data Base Protection Languages," Proc. of
the ACM Annual Conf. (Oct. 1976) 90-95-

43

HELL78

Hellman, M.E., "Security in Communications Networks," AFIPS Conf.
Proc., 47 (1978NCC), 1131-1134.

IW70

Hoffman, L.J. and Miller, W.F., "Getting a Personal Dossier from a
Statistical Data Bank," Datamation 16. 5 (May 1970), 74-75.

HOPF77

Hoffman, L. J., Modern Methods for Computer -Security and Privacy.
Prentice Hall (1977).

HS1A78

Hsiao, D.X., Kerr, D.S., and Madnick, S.E., "Privacy and Security
of Data Comnunications and Data Bases," Proc. of Int'l Conf. en
Very Large Data Bases (Sept. 1978).

JONE76

Jones, A.K. and Liskov, B.H., "A Language Extension Mechanism for
Controlling Access to Shared Data," Proc. 2nd Int'l Conf. on Software Engineering, (1976), 62-68.

KAHN67

Kahn, D., The Codebreakers, Macmillan Co. (1967).

KARP70

Karplnski, R.H., "Reply to Hoffman and Shaw," Datamation 16, 10,
(Oct. 1970), 11.

KOMF70

Konfelder, L.M., "A Method for Certification," Lab. for Conputer
Sci., MIT (May 1978).

KOIIM78

Konheim, A.G., "Cryptographic Methods for Data Protection,"
Research Report RC 7026 (#30100), IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center
(March 1978).

LAMP73

Lairpson, B.W., "A Note on the Confinement Problem," Coirm. ACM 16, 10
(Oct. 1973), 613-615-

IJ\MP7'J

Lempel, A., "Cryptography in transition," to appear Computing Surveys
(1979).

IJ-Wftf

Lennon, R.E., "Cryptography Architecture for Information Security,"
IBM Systems J. 17, 2 (1978), 138-150.

E.rNIT/b

Linden, T.A. , "Operating System Structures to Support Security and
Reliable Software," Conputing Surveys 8, 4 (Dec. 1976), 409-445.

LIPN75

Lipner, S., "A Comnent on the Confinement Problem," Proc. 5th Symp.
on Operating Systems Principles, Operating Systems Rev. 9, 5 (Nov.
1975) 141-160.

LIPT78

Lipton, R.J. and Budd, T.A., "On Classes of Protection System,"
in Foundations of Secure Confutation (see DEMI78), 281-296.

MAEN79

Madnick, S.E., Conputer Security, Academic Press, 1979-

MATY78

Mktyas, S.M. and Meyer, C.H., "Generation, Distribution, and Installation of Cryptographic Keys," IBM Systems J. 17, 2 (1978),

MERK78

1PG-137-

Merkle, R.C. and Hellman, M.E., "Hiding Information and Sipnatiuxx;
In Trap Door Knapsacks," ikw; Trans, on Information Theory (to appc-ar).

MEYE78

Meyers, G., Advances in Conputer Architecture, Wiley (1978).

MILL76

Mllen, J.K., "Security Kernel Validation in Practice," Oomn. A CM, 19,

M1LL78

5 (May 1976), 243-250.
Mlllen, J.K., "Constraints and Nultilevel Security," in Foundations oT
Secure Conputation (see EEMI78), 205-222.

MORR78

Morris, Robert and Thompson, Ken, "Password security: A case history,"
CS-TR-71, Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill, NJ 07974 (April 1978).

NBS77

National Bureau of Standards, Data Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 46
(Jan. 1977).

NEED77

Needham, R.M, and Walker, R.D.H., "The Cambridge CAP Corrputer and
Its Protection System," Proc. of Sixth Syitp. on Operating Systems
Prijic., Operating Systems Review

NEED78

11, 5 (Nov. 1977), 1-10-

Needham, R. and Schroeder, M., "Security and Authentication in Large
Networks of Conputers," Comm. ACM 21, 12, (Dec. 1978), 993-999-

NEUM77

Neumann, P.G. et al., "A Provably Secure Operating System: The
System, Its Applications, and Proofs," SRI International, Menlo Park,
CA 94025, Project 4332 Final Report (Feb.. 1977).

45

NTF,L7f>

Nielsen, N.F., Ruder, B., and Brandin, D.H., "Effective Safeguards
for Conputer System Integrity," AFIPS Conf. Proc. NOC 45 (1976),
75-84.

0RGA72

Organlck, E.I., Hie Multlcs System: An Examination of its Structure,
MIT Press (1972).

ORGA73

Organick, E.I., Conputer System Organization: The B57QQ/B6700 Series,
Academic Press (1973).

PARK76

Parker, D.B., Crime by Conputer, Charles Schribner's Sons (1976).

POFE74

Popek, G. J., "Protection Structures," Coircuter_ 7. 6 (June 1974), 22-31.

POPE78a

Popek, G.J. and Kline, C.S., "Design Issues for Secure Corrputer Networks,"
in Operating Systems, An Advanced Course, R. Bayer, R.M. Graham, G. Seegmuller, ed., Sprlnger-Verlag (1978).

POPE78b

Popek, G.J. and KLine, C.S., "Issues in Kernel Design, AFIPS Conf.
Proc. NCC 47, (1978), 1079-1086.

POPE78c

Popek, G.J. and Farter, D.A., "A rrodel for Verification of Data
Security in Operating Systems," Comn. ACM 21, 9 (Sept. 1978) 737-749-

RABT78

Rabin, M., "Digital Signatures Using Conventional Encryption Algorithms,"
Foundations of Secure Conputlng (See DEMI78), 155-166.

HEDKy4

Redell, D.R. and Fabry, R.S., "Selective Revocation of Capabilities",
Proc. Int'I Workshop of Protection in Operating; Systems, IRIA,
Rocquencourt, France (Aug. 1974).

RETT78

Reitman, R.P. and Andrews, G.R. "Certifying Information Flow Properties
of Programs: An Axiomatic Approach," Syracuse Univ. and Cornell Univ.
(1978).

RTVE78n

Rivest, R.L., Shamir, A., and Adleman, L. , "A Method for Obtaining
Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosvstems," Comm. ACM 21. 2
(Feb. 1978), 120-126.

I

46

RIVE78b

Rivest, R.L.j Adleman, L., and Dertouzos, M.L., "On Data Rank:; and
Privacy Homomorphlsms," in Ebundation of Secure Confuting (see DFJVII78),
169-179.

RPF77

"The Report of the Privacy Protection Study Conmission," Appendix 5,
"Technology and Privacy," U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Washington h.C.
20402, (July 1977).

SALT75

Saltzer, J.H. and Schroeder, M.D., "The Protection of Information
in Computer Systems," Proc. of the IEEE 63, 9 (Sept. 1975), 1278-1308.

SALT78

Saltzer, J., "On Digital Signatures," Operating Systems Rev. 12,
2, (April 1978), 12-14.

SCHL75

Schlorer, J., "Identification and Retrieval of Personal Records from
a Statistical Data Bank," Methods of Inform, in Medicine 14, 1 (Jan.
1975), 7-13.

SCHL77

Schlorer, J., "Confidentiality and Security in Statistical Data Banks,"
Proc. of the Workshop on Data Documentation, Verlag Dokumentation,
1977, 101-123.

SCHL78

Schlorer, J., "Security of Statistical Databases: Multidimensional
Transformation," TB-BED 2/78, Instltut fur Medizlnische Statistik
und Documentation, der Universitat Giessen, W. Germany (1978).

SCHL79

Schlorer, J., "Disclosure from statistical Databases: Quantitative
Aspects of Trackers," Instltut fur Pfedizinische Statistik Uhd Dokumentation, der Universitat Giessen, W. Germany (Mar. 1979), to appearin ACM Trans, on Database Syst.

SCHR72

Schroeder, M. and Saltzer, J.H., "A Hardware Architecture for Implementing Protection Rings," Com. ACM 15, 3 (Mar. 1972), 157-170.

SCHR77

Schroeder, M.D., Clark, D.D., and Saltzer, J.H., '"Hie MULTICS Kernel
Design Project," Proc. 6th Synp. on Operating Systems Principles,
Operating Systems Rev.

11, 5 (Nov. 1977), 43-56.

47

Schwartz, M.D., Denning, D.E., and Denning, P.J., "Linear Queries in
Statistical Data Bases," ACM TODS (1979) to appear.
Shamir, A., Rivest, R.L., and Adleman, L.M., "Mental Poker," Lab. for
Conputer Science, MIT (Jan. 1979).
Shankar, K.S., "The Total Conputer Security Problem: An Overview,"
Conputer 10, 6 (June 1977), 50-73Simmons, G.J., "Computational Conplexity and Secure Comnunlcations,"
To appear Computing Surveys (1979).
Snyder, L., "On the Synthesis and Analysis of Protection Systems,"
Proc. of the 6th Syirp. on Operating Systems Principles, Operating
Systems Rev. 11, 5 (Nov. 1977), 141-150.
Stonebraker, M. and Wong, E., "Access Control in a Relational Data
Base Management System by Query Modification," Proc. 1974 ACM
Annual Conf., (1974), 180-186.
Turn, R. and Ware, W.H., ,lPrIvacy and Security Issues in Information
Systems," IEEE Trans, on Conputers C-25, 12 (Dec. 1976), 1353-1361.
Walter, K.G., et al., "Structured Specification of a Security Kernel,"
Proc. Int. Conf. on Reliable Software. SIGPLAN Notices 10. 6 (June
1975), 26^293Weissman, C., "Security Controls in the ADEPT-50 Time-Sharing System,"
AFIPS Conf- Proc. 35, (1969 FJCC) 417-42Q.
Westin, A.P. and Baker, M.A., Databanks in a Free Society, Quadrangle
Books (1972).
Wilkes, M-V., Time Sharing Conputlng Systems, Elsevier/MacDonald
(1968), 3rd ed. (1975).
Yu, C.T., and Chin, F.Y., "A Study on the Protection of Statistical
Data Bases," Dept. Computing Science, Univ. Alberta, Ednonton (1977).

